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ABSTRACT
Background
Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease(vCJD) is ahuman priondisease caused byinfection with the
agent of bovine spongiform encephalopathy. After the recognition of vCJD in the UK in 1996,
many nations implemented policies intended to reduce the hypothetical risk of transfusion
transmission of vCJD. This was despite the fact that no cases of transfusion transmission had yet
been identified. In December 2003, however, the first case of vCJD in a recipient of blood from a
vCJD-infected donor was announced. The aim of this study is to ascertain and compare the
factors that influenced the motivation for and the design of regulations to prevent transfusion
transmission of vCJD in the UK and US prior to the recognition of this case.
Methods and Findings
A document search was conducted to identify US and UK governmental policy statements
and guidance, transcripts (or minutes when transcripts were not available) of scientific advisory
committee meetings, research articles, and editorials published in medical and scientific
journals on the topic of vCJD and blood transfusion transmission between March 1996 and
December 2003. In addition, 40 interviews were conducted with individuals familiar with the
decision-making process and/or the science involved. All documents and transcripts were
coded and analyzed according to the methods and principles of grounded theory. Data
showed that while resulting policies were based on the available science, social and historical
factors played a major role in the motivation for and the design of regulations to protect
against transfusion transmission of vCJD. First, recent experience with and collective guilt
resulting from the transfusion-transmitted epidemics of HIV/AIDS in both countries served as a
major, historically specific impetus for such policies. This history was brought to bear both by
hemophilia activists and those charged with regulating blood products in the US and UK.
Second, local specificities, such as the recall of blood products for possible vCJD contamination
in the UK, contributed to a greater sense of urgency and a speedier implementation of
regulations in that country. Third, while the results of scientific studies played a prominent role
in the construction of regulations in both nations, this role was shaped by existing social and
professional networks. In the UK, early focus on a European study implicating B-lymphocytes as
the carrier of prion infectivity in blood led to the introduction of a policy that requires universal
leukoreduction of blood components. In the US, early focus on an American study highlighting
the ability of plasma to serve as a reservoir of prion infectivity led the FDA and its advisory
panel to eschew similar measures.
Conclusions
The results of this study yield three important theoretical insights that pertain to the global
managementofemerginginfectiousdiseases. First,becausetheperception andmanagementof
disease may be shaped by previous experience with disease, especially catastrophic experience,
there is always the possibility for over-management of some possible routes of transmission and
relative neglect of others. Second, local specificities within a given nation may influence the
temporality of decision making, which in turn may influence the choice of disease management
policies. Third, a preference for science-based risk management among nations will not
necessarily lead to homogeneous policies. This is because the exposure to and interpretation of
scientific results depends on the existing social and professional networks within a given nation.
Together,thesetheoreticalinsightsprovideaframeworkforanalyzingandanticipatingpotential
conflictsintheinternationalmanagementofemerginginfectiousdiseases.Inaddition,thisstudy
illustratestheutilityofqualitativemethodsininvestigatingresearchquestionsthataredifficultto
assess through quantitative means.
The Editors’ Summary of this article follows the references.
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Avian inﬂuenza is the latest in a long line of zoonoses, or
diseases transmissible from animal to human, to raise the
specter of an impending epidemic of human-to-human trans-
mission[1].Solidarityamongstnationsintheirapproachtothis
threat is deemed to be one key to a successful response [2]. The
otheriscarefuluseofscientiﬁcdatatosculptarationalstrategy
[3].Thetwoarefelttogohandinhand,asitisofteninferredthat
a reliance on science will lead to appropriate and harmonious
policies amongstnations.
As efforts are already being made in many countries to
protectagainstanH5N1epidemic,nowisagoodtimetoreﬂect
on whether or not the use of science necessarily leads to
agreement amongst nations and what factors, other than
science, play a role in shaping disease management policy. In
this vein, a case study of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
(vCJD) is illustrative. vCJD is a prion disease that originated
fromthetransfer ofbovinespongiform encephalopathy (BSE),
or ‘‘mad cow disease,’’ from cattle to humans [4]. Almost
immediately after the disease was ﬁrst reported in 1996,
concerns were raised about the possibility of transmission of
thediseasebetweenhumansthroughbloodtransfusion[5].The
riskwaspurelyhypotheticalinnature,astherewasnoevidence
of transfusion transmission having taken place,. The ﬁrst
probable case of transfusion-transmitted vCJD would not be
identiﬁed until late 2003 [6], the second in 2004 [7]. And yet,
many nations implemented regulations aimed at reducing the
risk of such transmission while the risk was still hypothetical in
nature. This study inquires into the factors that inﬂuenced the
design of regulations to reduce the risk of transfusion trans-
mission of vCJD in the UK and the US before December 2003.
Prion diseases are fatal human and animal neurological
disorders deﬁned by their transmissibility and characteristic
neuropathology [8]. Scrapie, a prion disease of sheep, was ﬁrst
described more than 200 years ago [9]. In the 1950s, scrapie
spread from Europe to many other parts of the world,
including the US. The most common human form of prion
disease is sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD). The
incidence of sCJD is approximately one out of 1 million
people per year, in each country around the world [10].
Certain populations are also plagued by familial forms of
prion disease, including Gerstmann-Straussler syndrome [11]
and familial CJD [12].
CJD was ﬁrst perceived as an infectious threat to developed
nations when contaminated human growthhormone and dura
mater grafts transmitted the disease to more than 250
individuals in the 1980s and 1990s [13]. However, it was the
emergence of the BSE epidemic among British cattle in 1986,
andthetransmissionofBSEtohumansintheformofvCJD[14],
that provided the major impetus to develop coherent disease
management policies in many nations. So far, more than 177
individuals have succumbed to vCJD, all but 21 of them UK
residents [15]. Only one US resident, who spent much of her
childhood in the UK, has been diagnosed with the disease [15].
The sense of urgency that accompanied vCJD was felt most
strongly in the UK, where the number of cattle diagnosed
with BSE had topped 170,000 by 1997 [16]. Some biostatis-
ticians estimated that this was just the tip of the iceberg,
representing only a fraction of the actual number of cases
[17]. The US did not detect BSE in its cattle herds until 2003
[18]. And yet, vCJD became a concern in the US due to the
number of US military troops stationed in the UK during the
peak of the BSE epidemic and the volume of travel between
the two countries [19].
Thus, US and UK regulatory agencies convened meetings of
their scientiﬁc advisory committees to evaluate the literature,
consider what was known about the disease, and debate an
effective means of preventing further spread. Both nations
quickly identiﬁed potential transfusion transmission of vCJD
as a risk that required regulation. In assessing this risk, the cost
of limiting the blood supply was weighed against the potential
harm of a blood-borne vCJD epidemic. Both nations, in
parallelfashion,ultimatelychosetorestrictcertainportionsof
thedonorpool. The USandUK,however,developed strikingly
different positions regarding the removal of white blood cells
from blood components as a strategy for reducing vCJD
transmission risk. The process of removing white blood cells
from blood components is referred to by a variety of terms,
including leucocyte depletion, leucodepletion, leukocyte
reduction, and leukoreduction. The UK determined that
leukoreduction would likely reduce the transmission risk,
leading to a policy of universal leukoreduction. In the US, on
the other hand, it was felt that leukoreduction would have a
negligible effect on transmission risk and therefore did not
merit implementation for this purpose. Despite this differ-
ence, both US and UK regulatory agencies presented their
strategies as grounded in scientiﬁc evidence.
The questions that motivated this investigation were: (1)
How did transfusion transmission of vCJD become a
prominent concern of regulatory agencies in the US and
UK? (2) What role did science play in deliberations concern-
ing appropriate regulatory policy in each country? (3) What
non-scientiﬁc factors inﬂuenced the regulatory process in
each country? (4) And ﬁnally, if both the US and UK carried
out their deliberations in a science-based manner, how did
their processes result in policies that are parallel with respect
to sourcing of plasma but incongruous with respect to
leukoreduction of blood components?
The goal of qualitative research is the development of
concepts that aid in the understanding of social phenomena
[20]. As such, the goal of this study is not to ‘‘prove’’ or
‘‘verify’’ at e s t a b l eh y p o t h e s i s ,b u tt op r o v i d eas e to f
theoretical insights that illuminate the processes involved in
the management of emerging infectious diseases.
Methods
Initial Data Collection
The data for this paper are part of a larger study on prion
diseaseintheUSandUKthatwas conductedbetweenOctober
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vCJD and Transfusion2001 and July 2005. For this subsection of the study, a
background document search was conducted to identify US
and UK governmental announcements, policy statements,
documentationof governmentalscientiﬁcadvisory committee
meetings (including those of the US Food and Drug Admin-
istration Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory
Committee,theUSDepartmentofHealthandHumanServices
Blood Safety and Availability Committee, the UK Spongiform
Encephalopathy Advisory Committee, the UK Advisory Com-
mittee on the Microbiological Safety of Blood and Tissues for
Transplantation, and the UK Committee on the Safety of
Medicines), research articles, and editorials published on the
topic of vCJD and blood transfusion transmission between the
identiﬁcation of vCJD (March 1996) and the identiﬁcation of
theﬁrstlikelycaseoftransfusion-transmittedvCJD(December
2003). When transcripts of advisory committee meetings were
available, transcripts were always analyzed in preference to
minutes or summaries. When transcripts were not available,
minutes, summaries, and other supporting documentation
were analyzed. All document searches were restricted to the
period from March 1, 1996, to December 31, 2003, unless
otherwise speciﬁed.
UK governmental documents pertaining to the regulation
of vCJD with respect to the blood supply were identiﬁed
through online sources (Figure 1). The ofﬁcial Spongiform
Encephalopathy Advisory Committee Web site (http://www.
seac.gov.uk/papers/papers.htm) maintains archives of SEAC
meetings, from October 1997 onward. A search of the text of
minutes or summaries (when minutes were not available) of
the meetings that occurred between October 1997 and
December 2003 for the term ‘‘blood’’ yielded 20 results. Six
of the identiﬁed meetings were excluded from analysis
because the discussion did not pertain to human blood
products or blood transfusion (for example, the spreading of
bovine blood on ﬁelds as fertilizer). All documentation
available on the Web site from the remaining 14 meetings
Figure 1. UK Government Documents
Searches conducted with results returned and excluded at each step.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030342.g001
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documents dating from March 1, 1996, or later contained
within the BSE Inquiry Web site Yearbook section (http://
www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/evidence/yb/index.htm), comprised of
primary evidence gathered during the inquiry, led to the
identiﬁcation of nine additional documents in which blood
transfusion was discussed in relation to vCJD. These docu-
ments pertained to meetings of SEAC and other committees,
including three meetings of COHASE (Committee on the
Human Aspects of Spongiform Encephalopathies).
A search of the Government News Network site
(www.gnn.gov.uk), a repository for press releases and other
public documents of UK governmental departments, using
the terms ‘‘variant CJD blood’’ and selecting ‘‘all words’’ led
to the identiﬁcation of 31 documents relating to the topic
between March 1996 and December 2003. After duplicates
were excluded, 12 items remained. One was a summary of a
SEAC meeting that had already been identiﬁed in a previous
search, leaving 11 unique documents. Two of the eleven
documents identiﬁed were summaries of meetings of the
Advisory Committee on the Microbiological Safety of Blood
and Tissues for Transplantation (MSBT). An advanced search
of the Department of Health Web site (www.dh.gov.uk/
AdvancedSearch/fs/en) of all documents from March 1996 to
December 2003 for all of the words ‘‘variant CJD blood’’
returned ten documents, eight of which had already been
identiﬁed in the previous search and two of which were newly
identiﬁed and included in the analysis.
The Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency
(MHRA) of the UK Department of Health maintains archives
of meeting minutes of the Committee on Safety of Medicines
(CSM) from January 1998 onward at its Web site (http://www.
mhra.gov.uk). A search of the minutes of all meetings through
December 2003 for the term ‘‘CJD’’ led to the identiﬁcation
of 18 documents. Minutes were included in the analysis if the
documented discussion pertained to vCJD. All documents
met this criterion and were included in the analysis.
US governmental documents pertaining to the regulation
of the vCJD transfusion risk were identiﬁed through several
online sources (Figure 2). A search of the text of the agendas
of archived TSEAC meetings on the FDA dockets Web site
(http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/) for the term ‘‘blood’’ led
to the identiﬁcation of 11 meetings. Documents were
included in the analysis if they dealt with the topic of
transfusion transmission of vCJD. All of the meetings
identiﬁed met this criterion. Full transcripts were available
for analysis of all 11 meetings. Also at the FDA dockets Web
site, the agendas and transcripts of archived Blood Products
Advisory Committee (BPAC) meetings were searched for the
terms/phrases ‘‘vcjd’’, ‘‘variant cjd’’,o r‘‘variant creutzfeldt’’,
leading to the identiﬁcation of 16 meetings that included at
least one instance of one of these terms. One was a joint
meeting with TSEAC and was thus a duplicate of a document
already identiﬁed. Three meeting transcripts were excluded
from analysis because the mention of vCJD was incidental to
the discussion of another topic. In sum, the BPAC archives
Figure 2. US Government Documents
Searches conducted with results returned and excluded at each step.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030342.g002
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org October 2006 | Volume 3 | Issue 10 | e342 1754
vCJD and Transfusionsearch led to the identiﬁcation of 12 additional meeting
transcripts that were included in the analysis. While the
dockets Web site is inclusive of meetings from January 1997
to the present, searches were restricted to those meetings
occurring before December 2003.
A search of the text of transcripts of archived Blood Safety
and Availability Committee (BSAC) meetings on the BSAC
Web site (http://www.hhs.gov/bloodsafety/) for the phrase
‘‘variant CJD’’ led to the identiﬁcation of 16 meetings at
which vCJD was mentioned. Three of the meeting transcripts
were excluded from analysis because the mention of vCJD was
brief and incidental to another topic of discussion. The
remaining 13 meeting transcripts were analyzed as data. A
search of guidance documents published by the Center for
Biologics Evaluation and Review (CBER) of the FDA
(www.fda.gov/cber/guidelines.htm) using the terms ‘‘variant
CJD blood’’ led to the identiﬁcation of 12 documents. After
duplicates were excluded, ten items remained and were
included in the analysis.
Publications in scientiﬁc and medical journals related to
blood transfusion and vCJD, CJD, or leukoreduction were
identiﬁed by searching the National Library of Medicine’s
MEDLINE database using PubMed (Figure 3). A PubMed
search for the text words ‘‘CJD’’ or ‘‘Creutzfeldt-Jakob’’ and
‘‘blood’’ identiﬁed 162 items that were published before 31
December, 2003. Documents were excluded from analysis if
they were in a language other than English or if they were of a
topic that was considered to be unrelated to CJD or vCJD and
blood infectivity or blood transfusion risk. These criteria led
to the exclusion of 45 items from analysis. A PubMed search
for the phrases ‘‘universal leucocyte depletion’’ or ‘‘universal
leukocyte depletion’’ or ‘‘universal leukoreduction’’ or
‘‘universal leukocyte reduction’’ yielded 38 results that were
published before 31 December, 2003. Documents were
excluded from analysis if they had already been identiﬁed
in a previous search or if they were of a topic involving an
aspect of universal leukoreduction that was considered to be
irrelevant to the analysis. These criteria led to the exclusion
of eight documents. In sum, a total of 147 unique scientiﬁc
articles, scientiﬁc reviews, policy reviews, editorials, and
commentaries were included in the analysis.
Selection of Participants
Forty interviews were conducted with individuals familiar
with the decision-making process in the US or the UK. The
goal was to target the individuals who were most knowledge-
able about the way decisions were made regarding the
management of vCJD in each country. Situational, rather
than demographic, representativeness was desirable. Because
some decisions and recommendations were made in the
course of advisory committee meetings and others within the
agencies, it was decided that a situationally representative
sample would include members of US and UK advisory
committees as well as relevant government agencies. For
purposes of simpliﬁcation, only the advisory committee that
was most inﬂuential in determining the course of vCJD
management with respect to the blood supply, as judged by
document review, was targeted in each country. In the US,
this was the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy
Advisory Committee (TSEAC), and in the UK this was the
Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC).
In the US, all government employees who participated in
this portion of the study were employed by the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS). In the UK, the
government employees who were recruited for interview
came from the Department of Health as well as the National
Blood Service for England and Wales and the Scottish
National Blood Transfusion Service. Recruitment was con-
ducted in a stepwise fashion with the goal of recruiting
approximately equal numbers of participants from the US
and UK, with roughly twice as many advisory committee
members as government employees. First, 20 individuals who
were members of TSEAC or SEAC or who were government
agency employees involved in the management of vCJD were
invited to participate in the study. These individuals were
selected based on a number of considerations, including the
Figure 3. Scientific Publications, Editorials, and Reviews
Searches conducted with results returned and excluded at each step.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030342.g003
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advisory committee or in the government, their educational
background, their current position, and information pertain-
ing to their contributions that was derived from background
documents. Speciﬁcally, individuals were recruited to repre-
sent different backgrounds and to cover critical periods of
time in the decision-making process. Individuals were also
recruited based on the importance of the contributions they
made to the decision-making process as determined by the
document review. During interviews, other individuals
important to the decision-making process were identiﬁed
and further contacts were made. While most of these
additional contacts were also members of the advisory
committees or government employees, four were scientists
who were knowledgeable about the decision-making process
or the science involved, though they did not ofﬁcially serve on
advisory committees. In this way, recruitment and data
collection was an iterative process.
Of the 14 current or former members of the UK Spongi-
form Encephalopathy Advisory Committee who were invited
to participate in the study, 12 were ultimately interviewed. Of
the members of SEAC who participated, nine were university
professors. Six held advanced scientiﬁc degrees, three held
medical degrees, and one held a non-medical, non-scientiﬁc
degree. Of the three who were not university professors, two
held degrees in veterinary medicine, one with experience in
private practice and the other with experience in research. Of
the two who declined to participate in the study, one was a
university professor with an advanced scientiﬁc degree and
the other was a university professor with a degree in
medicine.
Of the 13 current or former members of the US Trans-
missible Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committees
contacted, 12 agreed to participate and were included in the
study. Of the 12 who ultimately participated, six were
professors at research universities. Of these, three held a
medical degree and three held advanced scientiﬁc degrees.
Five of the participants were researchers at government
agencies, one with a degree in medicine, two with advanced
scientiﬁc degrees, and two with veterinary degrees. One was a
representative from a consumer rights organization with a
degree in medicine. The individual who declined to partic-
ipate was a university professor with a medical degree.
All six of the current or former employees of UK
government agencies (Department of Health, National Blood
Service for England and Wales, and the Scottish National
Blood Transfusion Service) who were asked to participate
agreed to be interviewed. Three held medical degrees, two
held advanced scientiﬁc degrees, and one held a non-medical,
non-scientiﬁc degree. Four had more than 20 years’ experi-
ence in UK government agencies, and two had fewer than 20
years’ experience.
Of the seven current or former employees of US govern-
ment agencies (Department of Health and Human Services)
that were invited to participate, six agreed to be interviewed.
Of the six who participated, four held degrees in medicine
and two held advanced scientiﬁc degrees. Half had more than
20 years’ experience in government, and half had less than 20
years’ experience in government. The one who did not
participate had a medical degree and more than 20 years’
experience in government.
Four individuals with advanced scientiﬁc degrees who were
not governmental employees or scientiﬁc advisers were
identiﬁed by members of SEAC or TSEAC as knowledgeable
about the decision-making process and were also invited to
participate. All four ultimately participated. Three were
professors in the UK, and one was a professor in the US.
The ﬁnal tally of participants included six current or
former employees of UK government agencies (Department
of Health, National Blood Service for England and Wales, and
the Scottish National Blood Transfusion Service) and six
current or former employees of US government agencies
(Department of Health and Human Services), 12 current or
former members of the UK Spongiform Encephalopathy
Advisory Committee, 12 current or former members of the
US Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory
Committee, and four scientists who belonged to neither
group.
Interviews
Most interviews were conducted in person at a site that was
convenient for the interviewee. A small number of interviews
were conducted on the phone. In a few cases, more than one
interview was required to cover all the topics. The interviews
were conducted in an open-ended, semi-structured manner, a
technique common in ethnographic research [21]. While
there was no speciﬁc order to the questions that were asked, it
was ensured that the interview would cover the four topics
listed at the end of the introduction. Interviews were
recorded and transcribed verbatim.
Analysis
All data, including interview transcripts, transcripts or
minutes of advisory committee meetings, agency announce-
ments, and scientiﬁc literature, were analyzed using the
general principles of grounded theory [22,23]. Grounded
theory is a qualitative methodology that allows for the study
of topics in medicine and policy that are difﬁcult to
investigate through deductive, quantitative mechanisms. For
example, researchers have used variations of grounded theory
to ask why people delay seeking care after a heart attack [24]
and how physicians and nurses decide whether to report a
medical error [25].
Grounded theory focuses on uncovering the social pro-
cesses and conditions that lie behind the phenomena in
question and following their consequences and effects. It
offers a systematic process through which concepts can be
developed inductively. Rather than beginning with a hypoth-
esis, the researcher begins with a set of questions. Codes are
then generated through the labeling of concepts, and the
concepts are grouped into categories. Conceptual categories
are then reﬁned in terms of their properties and variations
through the analysis of further data. Connections between
categories are labeled through a process referred to as axial
coding, eventually forming the basis for constructing major
categories.
Speciﬁcally, data analysis proceeded as follows. First, data
were stratiﬁed by country (US versus UK), source (regulatory,
scientiﬁc advisory committee, etc.), and regulation strategy
under discussion (leukoreduction, deferral of donors, etc.).
Descriptive codes were then developed based on the type of
information cited (scientiﬁc, experiential, etc.), the origin of
the material, and the role it played in the consideration of
various risks and policy interventions. Through a comparison
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categories were derived. Categories developed in the analysis
of data from documents were compared to those developed
through the analysis of interview data, allowing for cross-
validation between the categories derived from different
types of data. As a check on the validity of the author’s
interpretations, one respondent from each of the ﬁve groups
interviewed (members of SEAC, members of TSEAC, UK
government employees, US government employees, and
other) was consulted regarding the appropriateness of the
categories that pertained to his or her participant group.
From the resulting ﬁnal categories, a series of theoretical
insights were derived by the author, three of which will be
described in this paper.
Results
Existing Scientific Evidence and Uncertainty
Government agency employees and scientiﬁc advisors from
both the US and UK were quick to point to a scientiﬁc basis
for the concern about transfusion transmission of vCJD. They
also pointed to the uncertainty, however, that accompanied
the interpretation of the evidence. Prior to the appearance of
vCJD, several studies had detected infectivity in the blood of
rodents with prion disease [26–28]. These data, along with the
growing number of human growth hormone and dura mater
transmitted cases of sCJD [29,30], led to the development of
concern that sCJD could be transmissible through blood
transfusion [28,31]. Several countries, including the US,
instituted policies aimed at preventing the transmission of
sCJD through blood [32]. Concern about this route of
transmission, however, was mitigated by epidemiological
studies that reported no association between blood trans-
fusion and sCJD [33–35] and surveillance studies that failed to
detect cases of sCJD in frequent users of blood products, such
as people with hemophilia [36]. Despite the reassuring
evidence on sCJD, vCJD was viewed as an entirely new disease
with potentially concerning properties. Unlike sCJD, infec-
tivity was detected in the lymphoreticular tissue, such as
tonsil, appendix, and lymph nodes, of patients with vCJD
[37,38]. Because this pattern was similar to that found in
rodents with prion disease, it led to speculation that vCJD,
like rodent-adapted prion disease, could be transmissible
through blood. There was no direct evidence, however, to
implicate the blood of individuals with vCJD as infectious.
The concern was therefore considered hypothetical in nature.
The weight granted to this hypothetical concern derived in
part from the uncertainty surrounding the magnitude of the
vCJD epidemic. With no ante-mortem diagnostic test capable
of detecting prion disease in humans, it was impossible to
assess the number of individuals infected. The unknown, yet
potentially lengthy, incubation period made this number
difﬁcult to estimate. As a result, early predictions of the size
of the vCJD epidemic ranged from as few as 75 people to as
many as 13.7 million people [39,40].
Donor Selection Criteria: The Influence of the HIV
Experience in the US
The existing prion disease science and the uncertainty
surrounding the vCJD epidemic, however, were not the only
factors that led to a focus on transfusion as a potential
transmission risk of vCJD. All but one of the US government
agency employees interviewed stated that if it had not been
for past experience with HIV, and to a smaller extent
hepatitis C, it is unlikely that the issue of transfusion
transmission of vCJD would have garnered so much attention.
The single employee who did not support this position had
not participated directly in the management of HIV at the
agency. According to the remainder of the government
employees interviewed, the history of HIV/AIDS is something
that had come to haunt US regulatory agencies, especially the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). This stems from a
decision made by the FDA in 1983 not to call for removal
from the market of plasma products from donors with AIDS
[41]. After a widespread epidemic of transfusion trans-
missions ensued, the FDA was called to task for this decision
by hemophilia activists, by the US Congress, and by various
news organizations. One US government employee suggested
that when it came to regulating blood, the fallout from HIV/
AIDS continues to affect decision-making at the agency
‘‘every minute of every day.’’
Along these lines, half of the US government agency
employees also mentioned the inﬂuence of the Institute of
Medicine (IOM) report on HIV transmission through blood
and blood products. This report, published in 1995, a year
before vCJD was discovered, recommended that a precau-
tionary stance be taken with regard to potential future
threats to the blood supply [41]. Uncertainty, the report
claimed, should not be an excuse for inaction, especially when
it came to the efforts by the FDA to regulate blood and blood
products.
This history loomed large as the DHHS brought questions
about the potential transmissibility of vCJD through blood to
the Blood Products Advisory Committee (BPAC), the Trans-
missible Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee
(TSEAC), and the Blood Safety and Availability Committee
(BSAC). In addition, there was a heightened state of concern
and political activism within the hemophilia community due
to recent experience with HIV/AIDS. Tens of thousands of
people with hemophilia had contracted the disease through
contaminated plasma products, and the community was wary
of another threat to transfusion safety.
According to all but one of the US government agency
employees interviewed, hemophilia activists played a major
role in ensuring that the concern about vCJD transfusion
transmission became a focus at the agency. They did this by
writing letters, arranging meetings with staff, and attending
andspeakingat advisorycommitteemeetings.Thiscontention
is supported by government documents [19,42,43] as well. The
single US government employee who did not feel that
hemophilia activists played a major role in ensuring that the
concern about vCJD transfusion transmission became a focus
at the agency was the same employee who felt that the HIV/
AIDSexperience hadnotinﬂuenced themanagement ofvCJD.
Three-quarters of the members of TSEAC who were
interviewed expressed their belief that the recent experience
with transfusion transmission of HIV/AIDS played a signiﬁ-
cant role in creating concern about the hypothetical risk of
transfusion transmission of vCJD. They felt that the impas-
sioned speeches of hemophilia activists at advisory committee
meetings inﬂuenced the direction of the discussion and the
recommendations made. In addition, a few members of
TSEAC were inﬂuenced by their personal experience in
advising on blood policy during the HIV epidemic.
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TSE advisory committee for reducing the exposure to vCJD
through the blood supply was to disqualify donors who had
spent time in the UK and other countries in which BSE had
been reported [19]. This strategy, however, conﬂicted with the
goal of maintaining an adequate blood supply. As a result,
discussion at advisory committee meetings centered on
balancing the potential beneﬁt achieved through donor
exclusion criteria with the potential risk of reducing the
blood supply [19,43,44].
Blood collection organizations presented the advisory
committees with information and projections regarding the
effects of various donor selection criteria on the blood
supply. Based on a survey, the American Red Cross (ARC)
estimated a loss of 11.7% in blood donations if everyone who
visited the UK between 1984 and 1990 was excluded [19].
Representatives of the ARC expressed their concern that
recruitment efforts would not be able to make up for such a
loss. The American Association of Blood Banks (AABB),
estimating a loss of 1.4 million to 2 million units each year,
projected devastating problems for the blood supply [19].
Members of the hemophilia community attended advisory
committee meetings and demanded that maintaining an
adequate supply should not overshadow safety concerns
[19,42,43,45]. They pointed out that such concerns had
prevented the appropriate management of HIV with respect
to the blood supply. An example of this type of speech is
exhibited by Jan Hamilton of the Hemophilia Federation at a
1998 BSAC meeting:
Does anyone hear an echo? An echo which eerily reminds
us of the early 1980s? Are we once again being led down a
path which will attack and eradicate several thousand more
persons with hemophilia? We are constantly being put in the
position of having to take the risks and our community is
woefully tired of being the canaries in the coal mine ...[42]
This line of argument was subsequently taken up by
members of the advisory committees. For example, Barbara
Harrell, a consumer representative on TSEAC, remarked at a
1998 meeting that: ‘‘the reluctance to reduce the repeat
donor pool to reduce the theoretical risk of HIV allowed that
disease to become epidemic in the United States’’ [19].
In order to balance these two competing concerns,
members of TSEAC recommended restricting donor deferral
to individuals who had spent a signiﬁcant amount of time in
the UK. Because the majority of US tourists visit the UK for
only a short amount of time, it was suggested that such a
measure would limit losses to the blood supply while
excluding the riskiest donors. To aid in their selection of
the appropriate criteria, committee members asked the
blood-banking community to conduct another survey that
would specify the amount of time blood donors had spent in
the UK [19].
The results from this survey led to the introduction of a
tiered system of deferrals based on the estimated loss of
donors at each level. In November 1999, the FDA instituted
deferrals for anyone who had spent more than six months in
the UK between 1980 and 1996 [46]. In May 2002 they
decreased the allowable amount of time in the UK to three
months and added a deferral for members of the US military
who had been stationed in certain other parts of Europe for
more than six months [46]. In October 2002, a deferral was
instituted for all donors who had spent a total of more than
ﬁve years in Europe from 1980 to the present [46]. At each of
these steps, the number of donors likely to be lost was
weighed against the potential risk reduction [43,44].
Donor Selection Criteria: The Influence of the HIV
Experience in the UK
In the UK at that time, unlike the US, governmental
advisory committee meetings were closed to the public. While
hemophilia activists were unable to attend these meetings,
they found other avenues through which to make their voices
heard. An example of this is an open letter published in The
Lancet by the United Kingdom Haemophilia Centre Directors’
Organization (UKHCDO), demanding access for people with
hemophilia to plasma products imported from countries
thought to be free of BSE [47]. In their letter, the UKHCDO
explicitly drew on past experience with AIDS in calling for
such regulations.
Following the UKHCDO’s letter, Nature reported that
‘‘foot-dragging by the British government is exposing
hemophiliacs to an avoidable risk of infection with the new
variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease’’ [5]. Although such a
measure had not been recommended by SEAC, UK Health
Minister Frank Dobson announced in February 1998 that UK
plasma fractionation centers would begin importing plasma
from BSE-free countries for the production of plasma
products. In his reasoning, Dobson explicitly noted that
while the risk of vCJD transmission ‘‘is hypothetical, never-
theless the fear of it is very real to this group which has
previously been affected by both HIV and Hepatitis C
transmitted from Factor VIII’’ [48].
As in the US, the selection of appropriate donor restriction
criteria in the UK was inﬂuenced by competing interest in
maintaining an adequate blood supply. Signiﬁcantly, the
donor selection restrictions in the UK were applied to only
plasma products and not labile components such as packed
red blood cells. Due to their limited shelf life, there was
concern in the UK about maintaining an adequate supply of
labile components from overseas sources.
In interviews, all UK governmental employees said that the
experience with HIV/AIDS played a crucial role in shaping
concern about vCJD transmission through blood and plasma
products, especially through concerns raised by the hemo-
philia community. Evidence for this is found in government
documents as well [49]. Half of the government employees
mentioned the threat of recalls of plasma products for
possible vCJD contamination, as occurred in October and
November of 1997 in the UK [50], in contributing to the
decision to import plasma. Government employees pointed
out that recalls are expensive to carry out and often much of
the product has already been consumed by the time of the
recall, leading to fear of exposure on the part of consumers.
Just prior to the UK’s decision to import plasma, the
Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products, Europe’s
pharmaceutical regulator, banned pharmaceuticals contain-
ing UK-derived albumin, a measure designed to avoid such
recalls [51]. While mentioned in only one interview, this likely
played a role in the UK’s decision-making process, as
evidenced by documentation of meetings held by the
Committee on the Safety of Medicines [52–54].
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background of HIV/AIDS contributed to the focus on blood
as an avenue for transmission of vCJD, none of the members
of SEAC felt that hemophilia activists had a direct impact on
the ﬂow of the discussion or the decision making by
committee members. Such an outcome is not surprising
considering that hemophilia activists were not present at
SEAC meetings. This observation is also consistent with the
fact that SEAC did not recommend the importation of
plasma at their 24 October 1997 meeting.
Consideration of Leukoreduction as a Risk Management
Strategy in the UK
At their 24 October 1997 meeting, SEAC recommended
‘‘that the Government should consider a precautionary policy
of extending the use of leucodepleted blood and blood
products as far as is practicable’’ [55]. Leucodepletion, often
referred to as leukoreduction in the US, is deﬁned as the
removal of white blood cells by ﬁltration or other approved
methods so that less than a speciﬁed number of lymphocytes
remain in the ﬁnal product [56]. The members of SEAC
interviewed who were serving on the committee at the time
agreed that one particular scientiﬁc study became the focus
of discussion and motivated their decision to recommend
leukoreduction. This study, conducted by Adriano Aguzzi’s
lab at the University of Zurich, had not yet been published.
The committee was made aware of the study prior to
publication through the existence of social and professional
connections between Aguzzi’s lab and scientists and regu-
lators in the UK.
Aguzzi’s experiment employed a variety of transgenic
mouse models to clarify which elements of the immune
system were required for prion infection [57]. Some of the
mice were missing genes necessary for the production of B
and T cells, some for the production of B cells only, and
others for the production of T cells only. Aguzzi’s group
reported that when exposed, the mice deﬁcient in functional
T cells developed the disease normally while those deﬁcient in
B cells were protected. They concluded that ‘‘B cells may be
the physical carriers of prions’’ in the blood [57].
While Aguzzi’s results did not prove that B cells carry
prions, scientiﬁc advisors and regulators were intrigued by
this possibility. It implied that merely removing B cells from
blood products could reduce the likelihood of transmitting
infection. On this basis, SEAC suggested that ‘‘it is logical to
seek to minimize any risk from blood or blood products by
reducing the number of lymphocytes present’’ [55].
Members of SEAC viewed Aguzzi’s results as consistent with
the results of prior experiments on blood that had detected
infectivity through assay of the buffy coat, a component of
blood in which lymphocytes are concentrated. The buffy coat,
in fact, had been the sole component of blood to be assayed
in many of these studies [26,27]. This was due to the notion
that prion infectivity should be cell-associated. In other
words, most researchers had not looked for infectivity in
plasma or other blood components.
All of the UK government employees identiﬁed the results
of this experiment as having a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
subsequent decision of the UK Department of Health to
implement SEAC’s recommendation. More than half indi-
cated that if the political environment at the time had not
necessitated immediate action on the issue, the results of a
single experiment would never have been relied on to such an
extent. Pressure from the public was building in light of the
identiﬁcation of several vCJD victims who had previously
donated blood. In late October and early November of 1997,
the UK government issued recalls of blood products for
possible vCJD contamination [50]. In both cases, most of the
implicated blood products had already been consumed. The
recalls were highly publicized, and the resulting public
concern raised the stakes for risk reduction efforts. Two days
after the second recall announcement, Health Minister Frank
Dobson issued a press release stating that the government had
accepted SEAC’s advice related to vCJD and had instructed
the NBS ‘‘to start work towards the possible extension of
leucodepletion of blood’’ [58].
In July 1998, after the NBS had developed the appropriate
infrastructure for managing universal leukoreduction, the
policy was ofﬁcially implemented [59]. In the interim between
the government’s acceptance of SEAC’s recommendation and
its implementation, Lord Phillips’ inquiry into the manage-
ment of BSE had begun [60]. New revelations about the
mishandling of the BSE crisis appeared in the papers daily,
increasing the pressure on the government to do something.
In announcing the implementation, Frank Dobson said: ‘‘We
will do whatever we are advised to reduce the theoretical risk
to the blood supply of the transmission of nvCJD’’ [59].
Even at the time, a reduction in vCJD transfusion trans-
mission risk was not viewed as the only potential beneﬁt of
leukoreduction. As the Deputy Chief Medical Ofﬁcer, Jeremy
Metters, noted: ‘‘There are a variety of beneﬁts for patients
attributed to the use of leucodepleted blood. It avoids the risk
of fever in patients who require repeated transfusions,
reduces the risk of graft rejection in patients requiring bone
marrow transplants, and prevents infections in babies young-
er than a year’’ [59]. It was estimated by the NBS, however,
that such identiﬁable clinical beneﬁts could not justify the
cost of implementing universal leukoreduction [61]. Instead,
Dobson and Metters emphasized that ‘‘SEAC’s expert advice
is that leucodepletion would be a sensible and practical
precautionary measure to take against the theoretical risk
from [vCJD] because if infectivity were to be present in blood,
it would most likely be in the white cells’’ [59].
While a risk assessment of vCJD transfusion transmission
was commissioned on the advice of SEAC, the majority of the
government employees and members of SEAC who were
interviewed felt that it had little impact on the actual
decision-making process. Support for this conclusion is
found in documentation indicating that both the policy to
import plasma and the policy to universally leukoreduce
blood components were implemented before the risk assess-
ment was completed [49,59,62]. Among the majority who felt
the risk assessment did not play a signiﬁcant role in the
decision-making process, the most common reason given was
that the risk assessment involved too many uncertainties
about which unreliable assumptions were made.
Consideration of Leukoreduction as a Risk Management
Strategy in the US
TSEAC also held its ﬁrst meeting devoted to the trans-
fusion transmission risk of vCJD in October 1997 [45]. The
TSEAC meeting, however, followed a rather different format.
Aguzzi’s study was not presented. Instead, the focus in terms
of laboratory data was on the preliminary results of a study
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Brown and Rohwer had examined the distribution of prion
infectivity in different blood components and plasma
fractions [63]. Like Aguzzi’s research results when they were
ﬁrst presented to SEAC, the results of their study were
unpublished at the time. Also like Aguzzi’s study, their study
had come to the attention of regulators through social and
professional connections.
Brown and Rohwer conducted their experiments in mice
infected with Gerstmann-Straussler syndrome, pooling the
blood from multiple animals and then separating and
fractionating it in a scaled-down version of the process used
by blood banks to process human blood [63]. They reported
that while infectivity was present in buffy coat, it was also
detectable in other blood components, such as plasma. In
fact, it appeared that less than half of the total infectivity in
blood was contained in the buffy coat. They admitted that
this result came as a surprise to them [45].
While Brown and Rohwer’s results were ﬁrst presented to
TSEAC in October 1997 [45], Aguzzi’s results would not be
presented to the committee until December 1998 [19]. By that
time, many of the committee members were already aware of
Aguzzi’s results because they had been published [57]. At this
meeting, Aguzzi interpreted the results more cautiously than
he had in his publication, suggesting that while B-lympho-
cytes seemed to be required for infection, they might not
carry prions [19]. At the same meeting, Rohwer again
presented his ﬁnding that less than half of the infectivity in
blood appeared to be associated with lymphocytes [19]. After
much discussion, TSEAC recommended that deferrals be
instituted for donors who spent a signiﬁcant amount of time
in the UK in order to decrease vCJD transfusion risk [19].
Leukoreduction, however, was not even suggested as a
management strategy.
In June 2000, the FDA asked TSEAC to speciﬁcally consider
the question of whether leukoreduction could be expected to
reduce the risk of transmitting vCJD [44]. BPAC had
recommended leukoreduction in 1998 for unrelated beneﬁ-
cial purposes: reducing non-hemolytic transfusion reactions
and preventing the transmission of cytomegalovirus. Despite
BPAC’s recommendations, practical considerations, such as
cost, had so far prevented the FDA from implementing
regulations requiring universal leukoreduction. At this meet-
ing, FDA asked TSEAC to exclude these beneﬁts from its
consideration and focus solely on vCJD.
Rohwer once again presented the results of the prion
infectivity distribution experiment, indicating that less than
half of the infectivity in blood was associated with the buffy
coat [44]. While a member of Aguzzi’s lab contributed to the
meeting, he focused on the results of more recent experi-
ments implicating the follicular dendritic cell, a long-lived
component of the immune system that resides in the spleen
and lymph nodes, as a potential site of prion replication [44].
He also presented the results of an experiment in which
reconstituting the B-lymphocytes of PrP-expressing mice
from PrP knock-out mice could re-establish susceptibility to
prion infection [64]. He interpreted these results as indicat-
ing that B-lymphocytes do not carry infectivity themselves,
but are required for the functioning of other components
that do [44]. As cells that depend on signaling from B-
lymphocytes for their maturation, follicular dendritic cells
were an ideal candidate.
Results of parallel experiments in a different laboratory
afﬁrmed that PrP expression was not required by B-
lymphocytes for infection with prion disease, suggesting that
B-lymphocytes were unlikely to be the carrier of infectivity
[65]. While not presented or discussed at the TSEAC meeting,
at least three members of TSEAC were aware of these results
at the time of the meeting.
When it came time for TSEAC to vote on whether
leukoreduction could be expected to decrease signiﬁcantly
the infectivity theoretically present in the blood of persons
with vCJD, the measure lost 13 to two [44]. Even the two
members of the committee who voted in the afﬁrmative both
qualiﬁed their votes by stating that there was ‘‘insufﬁcient
information’’ at present to be assured of this conclusion.
More than three-quarters of the members of TSEAC and all
but one of the US agency employees interviewed mentioned
Brown and Rohwer’s study when discussing the rationale for
the decision not to require leukoreduction for the purpose of
reducing vCJD transmission. While they were aware of
Aguzzi’s 1997 results, more than half of the members of
TSEAC indicated that they were unsure of how to interpret
them in light of further research. Four of the government
employees interviewed indicated that Aguzzi’s results had lost
their allure by the point in time that TSEAC considered
leukoreduction. One government employee speciﬁcally
pointed out that the results of Brown and Rohwer’s experi-
ment negated the initial interpretation of Aguzzi’s experi-
ment that B-cells were the carrier of prions.
Subsequent Events
In December 2003, the ﬁrst probable transmission of vCJD
through blood transfusion was announced [67]. The victim
developed symptoms of vCJD 6.5 years after receiving a blood
transfusion at the age of 62 [6]. One of the units of red cells he
received had been donated by a 24-year-old man who later
developed vCJD. Statisticians calculated the probability of
recording a case of vCJD in this recipient in the absence of
transfusion transmission to be from one in 15,000 to one in
30,000 [6]. In response to this case, the UK government
announced a new policy excluding those who received blood
transfusions after 1980 from donating blood [67].
Then, in August 2004, researchers published another
worrisome case. They identiﬁed the disease-causing form of
the prion protein (PrPres) in the spleen of a recipient of
blood from a vCJD donor [7]. In this case, however, the
patient had died of causes unrelated to vCJD. In fact, no
PrPres had been identiﬁed in the patient’s brain and there
were no signs of neurological damage. Researchers ques-
tioned whether he would have gone on to develop the disease
had he lived long enough [7]. In addition, this patient was of a
different genotype than all other patients who had contracted
vCJD. He was heterozygous for methionine/valine at codon
129 of the prion protein gene [7]. This raised concern about
whether a larger subsection of the UK population might be at
risk for contracting the disease than was previously thought.
Even though the majority of research now indicates that
lymphocytes are unlikely to be the carriers of prion
infectivity in blood, the UK has not rescinded its policy of
leukoreduction. This is reconcilable with the fact that
leukoreduction has only increased in popularity around the
world since the UK made its decision, largely due to the
reputation of leukoreduction as a process capable of
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continues its policy of universal leukoreduction, and many
other European countries and Canada have instituted the
process as well [71–73]. In the US, multiple hospitals and
blood banking services have implemented their own leukor-
eduction policies despite the fact that it is not an FDA
requirement [74].
Discussion
Qualitative case studies, such as the one described in this
article, provide an in-depth exploration of phenomena
bounded by space and time [75]. As such, the results of a
single case study are not expected to hold true universally.
They may be thought of as generalizable, however, in that
they attune us to certain possibilities and provide a frame-
work for analyzing similar phenomena [76]. The term
‘‘theoretical insight’’ will be used in place of ‘‘conclusion’’
in the following discussion in order to delineate this differ-
ence. While such theoretical insights should not be expected
to apply in all cases, they are useful in that they provide a
mechanism for anticipating possible future issues in the
management of emerging infectious disease.
In the past three decades, considerable efforts have been
made at the international level to enhance the science-based
quality of risk management. These efforts have been driven
by the desire to harmonize regulations and generate solid-
arity among nations, especially when issues of trade are
involved [77]. Such harmonization is thought to be important
to the smooth functioning of a free market. In this vein, the
1995 Sanitary and Phytosanitary Act of the World Trade
Organization called for all nations to base their food and
consumer product safety regulations on science [78].
While science is indeed an ingrained component of disease
management policy in many countries, science is not the only
factor that inﬂuences disease management policy. Recent
experience with other infectious diseases can have a
substantial impact on the direction and focus of disease
management policy. For example, the propensity to issue
recalls of blood and blood products in Western countries for
fear of transfusion transmission risk is inﬂuenced by the
experience with HIV/AIDS [79,80]. Past experience is invoked
both by affected communities as well as relevant regulators
and scientists. Such was the case with vCJD, where recent
experience with transfusion transmission of HIV generated a
context of heightened concern about other potential risks to
the blood supply, leading to both recalls and the institution of
policy changes. In contrast, recent experience with infectious
disease had the opposite effect when HIV was ﬁrst recog-
nized. In this case, prior experience with swine ﬂu [41] and
hepatitis B [81] led to the inappropriate minimization of
blood transfusion concerns. This leads us to our ﬁrst
theoretical insight: because the perception and management
of disease may be shaped by previous experience, especially
catastrophic experience, there is always the possibility for
over-emphasis of certain potential routes of transmission and
under-emphasis of others.
In the above case study, UK government employees and
scientiﬁc advisors were under substantially greater time
pressure and approached issues pertaining to vCJD with
more urgency than their US counterparts. The public in the
UK felt that they had been duped by their government about
the threat of BSE, leading to calls for an inquiry into the
government’s management of the disease. In addition, the UK
government’s recall of blood products for possible vCJD
contamination increased the sense of urgency in that country.
This sense of urgency led the UK government to implement
policies within a relatively short time frame. Because BSE and
vCJD had not yet reached the US, US ofﬁcials and scientiﬁc
advisors experienced less time pressure in considering
possible policy solutions, allowing for greater reﬂection on
the data and for the development of further scientiﬁc results
before making their decisions. Thus, the US did not impose
its ﬁrst set of deferrals until November 1999, more than a
year after the UK had implemented both its plasma
importation and universal leukoreduction policies. Our
second theoretical insight follows from this observation: local
speciﬁcities may inﬂuence the temporality and direction of
disease management.
In addition, and contrary to published opinion [77], the
growing reliance on science in determining appropriate risk
management strategies does not ensure policy agreement. As
exhibited in this case study, the differential uptake and
interpretation of scientiﬁc studies can result in contradictory
policy decisions. This differential uptake may result from the
existence of alternative social and professional networks,
which promote or allow access to certain scientiﬁc studies,
especially unpublished ones, at different points in time. In
other words, what Choi refers to as ‘‘knowledge exchange,’’ or
the transfer of information between science and policy [82],
occurs along networks that are social in character. This is not
a new insight, but one that has been recognized by scholars in
the discipline of science and technology studies for some time
[83–85]. Social networks inﬂuence decisions about who is
invited to present research at advisory committee meetings,
how many times they are invited to present, and the manner
in which committee members refer to certain research results
during discussions.
The resulting differences in exposure can have important
consequences for the interpretation of results and subse-
quent decision making. Such was the case with vCJD, where
an alternate sequence of exposure to scientiﬁc studies and a
relative imbalance in the prominence of different results due
to existing social networks led to contradictory scientiﬁc
interpretations of the utility of leukoreduction as a risk
management strategy. This leads to our third theoretical
insight: basing risk management decisions on science will not
necessarily lead to homogeneous policies amongst nations
because the exposure to and interpretation of scientiﬁc
results depends on existing social and professional networks.
Qualitative Research as a Technique for Investigating
Complex Social Phenomena in Medicine and Health Policy
While quantitative methods are ideal for testing hypotheses
regarding simple causal relationships, there are certain
research questions, such as the questions asked in this study,
that are not readily amenable to quantitative forms of
investigation. Other unrelated but important questions in
health care and health policy today, such as how physicians
decide whether to classify an event as a medical error,
provide similar challenges. Because these questions revolve
around the organization and culture of institutions and the
people who occupy them, they require the application of in-
depth, broad-based, qualitative methods.
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by clinicians who are more familiar with quantitative
methods. It should be remembered, however, that no form
of research is free from the inﬂuence of bias and personal
assumptions. As Ioannidis points out, quantitative studies are
habitually plagued by such issues, and they cannot be
eliminated simply by conducting more studies or involving
independent research teams [86]. ‘‘A major problem,’’ he
notes, ‘‘is that it is impossible to know with 100% certainty
what the truth is in any research question.’’
Popay has suggested that the primary marker of high-
quality qualitative research is its ability to produce a
provisional understanding of the basis of behavior and action
[87]. As such, good evidence in qualitative research is often
held to depend on a thorough investigation of subjective
meaning. In the above study, this was achieved through a
lengthy period of immersion (three years) in the ﬁeld of prion
research and prion policy production. This immersion
involved multiple discussions with members of advisory
committees, agency employees, and scientists as well as
participation and observation at multiple scientiﬁc meetings,
advisory committee meetings, and other forums for the
discussion of issues related to the topic of study.
While quantitative research aims for reliability through the
use of standardized mechanisms of data collection, such as
surveys, these tools are antithetical to qualitative research
[88]. Because most qualitative research is inductive, it is
important not to impose ready-made categories on the
process of data collection, which is precisely what the
application of a survey or a standardized interview format
does. Thus, while a transparent description of methodology is
key to ensuring reliability in qualitative research [88],
qualitative methods will never achieve the level of reliability
inherent in quantitative methods due to their interpretive
nature. This should not, however, negate the utility of
qualitative research. The complexity of interpreting and
evaluating qualitative research is a by-product of the same
characteristics that make qualitative methods suitable for the
investigation of otherwise impenetrable problems in medi-
cine and health policy. In other words, this shortcoming can
be viewed as an opportunity.
The three theoretical insights outlined in this paper: that
the perception and management of disease may be shaped by
previous experience, that local speciﬁcities inﬂuence the
temporality of decision making, and that the exposure to and
interpretation of scientiﬁc results may depend on existing
social and professional networks within a given nation,
provide a frame-work for analyzing differences in disease
management policy across nations. They also provide a
mechanism for anticipating future international manage-
ment issues concerning emerging threats to human health,
such as SARS, H5N1 inﬂuenza, and even bioterrorism. The
above analysis indicates that improved dissemination and
uptake of science-based criteria is not enough to ensure
solidarity. Thus, it is important to have other mechanisms in
place for enhancing cooperation when cooperation is
desired.
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Background. In 1996 in the UK, a new type of human prion disease was
seen for the first time. This is now known as variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease (vCJD). Prion diseases are rare brain diseases passed from
individual to individual (or between animals) by a particular type of
wrongly folded protein, and they are fatal. It was suspected that vCJD
had passed to humans from cattle, and that the agent causing vCJD was
the same as that causing bovine spongiform encephalopathy (or ‘‘mad
cow disease’’). Shortly after vCJD was recognized, authorities in many
countries became concerned about the possibility that it could be
transmitted from one person to another through contaminated blood
supplies used for transfusion in hospitals. Even though there wasn’t any
evidence of actual transmission of the disease through blood before
December 2003, authorities in the UK, US, and elsewhere set up
regulations designed to reduce the chance of that happening. At this
early stage in the epidemic, there was little in the way of scientific
information about the transmission properties of the disease. Both the
UK and US, however, sought to make decisions in a scientific manner.
They made use of evidence as it was being produced, often before it had
been published. Despite this, the UK and US decided on very different
changes to their respective regulations on blood donation. Both
countries chose to prevent certain people (who they thought would
be at greater risk of having vCJD) from donating blood. In the UK,
however, the decision was made to remove white blood cells from
donated blood to reduce the risk of transmitting vCJD, while the US
decided that such a step was not merited by the evidence.
Why Was This Study Done? This researcher wanted to understand more
clearly why the UK and US ended up with different policies: what role
was played by science, and what role was played by non-scientific
factors? She hoped that insights from this investigation would also be
relevant to similar challenges in the future—for example, as many
countries try to work out how to control the threat of avian flu.
What Did the Researcher Do and Find? The researcher searched for all
relevant official government documents from the US and UK, as well as
scientific papers, published between the time vCJD was first identified
(March 1996) and the first instance of vCJD carried through blood
(December 2003). She also interviewed people who knew about vCJD
management in the US and UK—for example, members of government
agencies and the relevant advisory committees. From the documents
and interviews, the researcher picked out and grouped shared ideas.
Although these documents and interviews suggested that policy making
was rooted in scientific evidence, many non-scientific factors were also
important. The researcher found substantial uncertainty in the scientific
evidence available at the time. The document search and interviews
showed that policy makers felt guilty about a previous experience in
which people had become infected with HIV/AIDS through contami-
nated blood and were concerned about repeating this experience.
Finally, in the UK, the possibility of blood contamination was seen as a
much more urgent problem than in the US, because BSE and vCJD were
found there first and there were far more cases. This meant that when
the UK made its decision about whether to remove white blood cells
from donated blood, there was less scientific evidence available. In fact,
the main study that was relied on at the time would later be questioned.
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings show that for this
particular case, science was not the only factor affecting government
policies. Historical and social factors such as previous experience, sense
of urgency, public pressure, and the relative importance of different
scientific networks were also very important. The study predicts that in
the future, infectious disease–related policy decisions are unlikely to be
the same across different countries because the interpretation of
scientific evidence depends, to a large extent, on social factors.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via the online
version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.
0030342.
  National Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance Unit, Edinburgh, UK
  US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention pages about prion
diseases
  World Health Organization variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease fact sheet
  US National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke information
about prion diseases
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